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Abstract
Over the last decade, scandals within the UK Financial Service sector have impacted their legitimacy and raised questions 
whether a compliance culture exists or not. Several institutional changes at the regulatory and normative levels have targeted 
stakeholders’ concerns regarding compliance culture and led to changes in the legitimation process. This paper attempts to 
address a gap in the literature by asking the following question: How is the UK financial institutions’ compliance culture 
shaped by the institutional environment and changing legitimacy claims? Towards achieving this objective, the paper draws 
on the institutional theory and pays attention to the various configurations of the legitimacy notion (property vs process 
Suddaby et al. Acad Manag Ann 11(1):451–478; 2017). The paper utilises a longitudinal interpretive design and undertakes 
a qualitative content analysis of fines issued by the UK regulator and the communicated response of violating firms as well 
as non-sanctioned firms. Our findings indicate that there is a cyclical ‘evolutionary compliance’ rather than the more widely 
recognised state of ‘compliance culture’. This culture is fuelled by interchangeable isomorphic forces where the majority 
of violating firms are seen to issue similar responses to the regulators sanction to maintain their reputation and legitimacy 
in the market. Notably, legitimacy is now defined within an interactive process between the regulator and firms rather than 
being static and achieved by ticking the box.
Keywords Compliance · Culture · Financial services · Regulation · Legitimacy
Introduction
The UK regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA),1 
has issued discussion papers on compliance culture pre 
and post the global financial crisis (FSA 2007; FCA 2013, 
2016b; PRA 2014), in an attempt to encourage financial 
institutions to adhere with norms of compliance culture. 
However, and despite these efforts, compliance violations 
are still evident within the UK financial sector. This phe-
nomenon could not only undermine the effectiveness of the 
regulatory efforts but would also question the existence of 
a compliance culture within the sector as indicated by the 
FCA director of enforcement and Financial Crime following 
comment:
The misconduct in relation to LIBOR has cast a 
shadow over the financial service industry. The find-
ings we publish today illustrate, once again, individu-
als within the industry acting with a cavalier disregard 
both for regulatory obligation and the interests of the 
markets. IEL’s significant failings in CULTURE and 
controls allowed that misconduct to flourish and fell 
far short of our expectations (FCA 2013, emphasis 
added).
Compliance can be defined as “conscious obedience to or 
incorporation of values norms or institutional requirements” 
(Oliver 1991, p.  152),2 while culture deals with ‘intra-
organizational processes’ (Kondra and Hurst 2009, p. 39), 
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1 However, this would not account for instance of non-compliant 
behaviours which may be ‘under the radar’ and unidentified by the 
regulator.
2 Whereas, compliance risk addresses the risk of legal or regula-
tory sanctions, material financial loss, or loss to reputation that a 
bank may suffer as a result of failure to comply with applicable laws, 
regulations, rules, related self-regulatory organisation standards, and 
codes of conducts (BASEL 2005).
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as such the concept of compliance culture is usually seen 
as embedded within the firm (Newton 2001) in response to 
institutional requirements (e.g. codes of conduct) which are 
communicated through senior management, and then layered 
down throughout organisations. In the extant literature, how-
ever, this internalisation of cultural norms imposed by the 
immediate environment (industry) raised questions regard-
ing the organisational orientation towards such compli-
ance culture (i.e. what does a company do about complying 
with such culture?) rather than whether it exists or not. An 
example for this can be seen in Jenkinson (1996). Clearly, 
organisational compliance with such culture is an expecta-
tion from the Financial Conduct Authority as indicated in 
the following quote “Where we believe cultural measures 
expose the firm to a high level of risk in the context of our 
objectives, we will expect the firm to take account of it” 
(FCA 2013, p. 1). Furthermore, examining the extant litera-
ture shows that the concept of culture has been studied from 
the perspective of the regulator (O’Brien et al. 2014; Ring 
et al. 2016). However, this has been criticised on the grounds 
that culture is presented in a ‘diffuse, inconsistent, and often 
simplistic ways’ (Meidinger 1987). There are similar con-
cerns with regard to the over simplification of the construct 
of legitimacy, and its widespread application resulting in 
misuse of the construct (Suddaby et al. 2017). Compounding 
the matter further, less has been said from the perspective of 
the compliance functions, within the firms where the con-
tinued dysfunctional cultural issues exist. Thus, an evident 
gap in the literature is to explore firms’ compliance culture 
and how it is formulated vis-à-vis the institutional environ-
ment in fulfilment of legitimacy claims from various stake-
holders. Clearly, this is increasingly important given recent 
media speculation about the shift in regulatory direction of 
the FCA, where it will no longer be viewed as ‘enforce-
ment-led’, or following the ‘shoot first, ask questions later’ 
approach after the appointment of Andrew Bailey in 2016.
Essentially, this shift not only marks a significant change 
in the institutional environment, but also a change in the 
notion of legitimation. Drawing on Suddaby et al. (2017), 
this could be interpreted as a shift from perceiving legiti-
macy as a property (which is simply achieved (or lost) by 
firms’ compliance (or non-compliance) with law and regu-
lations i.e. through coercion), to perceiving legitimacy as a 
process which socially constructs the terms of reference of 
legitimacy, as a process that is based on collaboration rather 
than enforcement. This led to formulation of our research 
question of: How is the UK financial institutions’ compli-
ance culture shaped by the institutional environment and 
changing legitimacy claims?
Against this background, this paper uses an institutional 
theory lens to investigate the concept of compliance culture 
within the UK financial sector. Here, the aim of this paper is 
to understand how financial institutions (both the offending 
and non-offending companies) internalise the institutional 
pressures from their immediate external environment in their 
quest to maintain legitimacy (Suchman 1995). Inevitably, 
the paper will also discuss the how this internalisation has 
been influenced by the change in the regulatory approach 
and the implications on legitimacy notion, if any.
Following a pragmatic research design, this paper under-
takes a longitudinal in-depth website analysis of the press 
releases of 23 non-compliant firms, alongside those of the 
regulator, during the period of 2013–2016. This captures 
the public responses of those firms fined by the regula-
tor (the FCA) for compliance culture failings. Essentially, 
this analysis is underpinned by institutional theory, where 
organisations follow an isomorphic pattern in responding 
to particular institutional pressures in order to maintain 
their legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 2014). 
The resulting model of evolutionary compliance culture 
evidences the impact of pressures, and the nature of regu-
latory flux which has advanced the pursuit of legitimacy 
from a ‘property’ (measurable) to a ‘interactive process’ 
(Suddaby et al. 2017) in the contemporary banking industry 
in the UK.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section 
explores the concept of compliance culture as presented 
within the academic and industry extant literatures. This is 
followed by the methods and methodology section. Then, the 
results and discussion of findings is presented. Finally, the 
conclusion, recommendations and areas of future research 
are highlighted in the last section.
Literature Review
Undoubtedly, there has been a general movement by both 
academic researchers and practitioners to identify and 
improve corporate governance structures within firms, since 
earlier crises of Enron, WorldCom, and Arthur Anderson 
at the start of the millennium, shortly followed thereafter 
by the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2008. A common 
underlying reason for these failure is what Zyglidopoulos 
et al. (2009) called a borderline and ‘delusional’ corpo-
rate culture caused by an over confidence in ability and 
importance. Of note that the extant literature focused on 
explaining the motivation behind practitioners’ actions to 
improve corporate governance compliance, here, a number 
of academics have correlated the implementation of effec-
tive corporate governance and control structures with an 
improved firms’ value (Hendricks and Singhal 1996; Akh-
igbe and Martin 2006; Henry 2008). However, with the cost 
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of compliance argued to be so high (Garcia 2004; Bam-
berger 2010; English and Hammond 2012, 2015), the fun-
damental question over why management comply remains 
ambiguous. Another line of research has focused on the role 
of media in setting the public agenda, and how this would 
be reflected within the publics’ perception of risk (McCa-
rthy and Dolfsma 2014). Here, some researchers focused 
and argued that governance reforms and enhanced compli-
ance is just an attempt by firms to improve their reputation 
and gain legitimacy (Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995) or 
just a reaction to enforcement by regulators (Yeung 2002; 
Zubic and Sims 2011). Although each of the previous jus-
tifications of corporate governance reforms and enhanced 
compliance is plausible, we argue that it captures one facet 
of a complex multi-faceted phenomenon that is being 
institutionalised, as compliance function is now viewed in 
practice as ‘core within organisations’ (Perezts and Picard 
2015). Here, firms may be seen to structure their compli-
ance function in response to institutional pressures as indi-
cated by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). These pressures are 
coercive (formal and informal pressures exerted by law and 
regulation), mimetic (firms modelling themselves on other 
organisations) and normative (resulting primarily from pro-
fessionalisation). In support of this view, Fashola (2014, 
p. 2) indicated that “Organizations are prone to yielding to 
coercive and normative pressures arising from their institu-
tional context (for example banks adhering to capital base 
requirements or to corporate governance code) as these are 
likely to confer social privileges from their stakeholders”. 
Additionally, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Aldrich 
(1979) agreed that the most crucial factors that organisa-
tion must consider are other organisations, as competition 
between organisations is not limited only to customers and 
resources but for “political power, institutional legitimacy... 
as well as economic fitness” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 
p. 150). Thus, companies can model their internal changes 
on other organisations in the field. The following sections 
will discuss in further detail the evolution of compliance 
function as co-created by organisations in response to exter-
nal institutional pressures namely: regulatory, normative 
and cultural.
Understanding Compliance Culture—Approaches 
Adopted by Firms
Organisational compliance culture reflects the individual 
firm’s approach to regulation (Alfon 1996, p. 20). It could 
also be linked to the firm’s attempt to adopt best practices 
or simply managing regulatory risk, which could obviously 
endanger its legitimacy and existence. Additionally, it can 
be affected by the leadership style within the organisation 
(Jenkinson 1996, p. 42) and whether the company is more 
interested in complying with the letter of law “while evading 
engagement with its substance spirit and soul” (Parker 2000, 
p. 342). The literature also highlights that the modification 
of compliance culture within organisations requires align-
ment of organisational ‘values, attitudes and beliefs’ to the 
principles of financial regulation (Newton 2001, p. 16). 
Dynamics of corruption and rationalisation can influence 
the organisational compliance culture (Zyglidopoulos et al. 
2009) as a “shared set of values and standards” (Barry 
2002, p. 39).
Moreover, compliance culture cannot be bought or 
‘taught by a high priced management consultant’ (Morton 
2005, p. 60), which further highlights the complexity of 
the concept as a socially constructed phenomenon. Subse-
quently, measuring compliance culture against set criteria 
can be problematic and simplistic. However, issues within 
culture cannot be ignored. Indeed, this has recently been re-
emphasised by the regulator whereby “culture may not be 
measurable, but it is manageable” (FCA 2017). Evidently, 
previous attempts to measure companies’ compliance cul-
ture have failed. Here, one example to demonstrate this, 
is that despite the assertion of the US regulator of a ‘for-
mal approach to assessing … culture of compliance’ (SEC 
2003), the adoption of this model clearly failed in the global 
financial crisis 2008. Similarly, the complexity of embed-
ding compliance culture is clear in the ongoing scandals 
within the UK financial service sector following the global 
financial crisis (for example the Libor scandal 2012). Thus, 
understanding companies’ compliance culture requires a 
holistic approach, which consider the compliance culture 
within the wider institutional environment. This holistic 
approach to understanding and embedding compliance cul-
ture may apply both internally within the firm by compliance 
officers’ communicating the spirit of regulation; but also 
externally through their relationship with the regulator and 
communicating and acknowledging the rapid pace of change 
within the wider financial services market place. The holis-
tic approach embraces the cooperation of all actors towards 
regulatory compliance. Noting that, companies may not nec-
essarily maintain the same compliance culture across the 
sector, with compliance approaches ranging from a state of 
non-compliance to over compliance (Jenkinson 1996, p. 42), 
whereby some organisations are extremely proactive and 
choose to ‘over comply’, and other organisations choosing a 
strategy of minimal efforts to achieve compliance, or indeed 
those that do not meet regulatory compliance standards.3
Acknowledging the complex nature of the compliance 
culture, previous studies have indicated that good com-
pliance involves engagement and persuasion within the 
3 This is explored within following literature review, including 
authors such as Jackman (2001), and Calcott (2010) who discuss the 
extremes of compliance approaches.
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organisation so that the “ethically and legally responsible 
action is consistent with business goals” (Parker 2000, 
p. 345). Moreover, it is about the culture and a commitment 
to partnership with the regulators (Edwards 2003). Still, to 
others “the concept of culture of compliance lacks defini-
tion, theoretical explication and empirical support for the 
proposed link with improved compliance outcome” (Interligi 
2010, p. 237). As such, better understanding of compliance 
culture would require reviewing the actual practice, which 
imposes the regulatory, normative and cultural pressures on 
the UK financial institutions and their related legitimacy 
basis. This will be discussed in the following sections.
Regulatory Pillar, Legitimacy and Compliance
There is extensive literature on the role of regulation, and the 
various regulatory approaches across sectors and jurisdic-
tions. Responsive regulation and the enforcement pyramid 
(Ayres and Braithwaite 1992) is widely cited in the literature 
(Ayres 2013) and offers a framework for regulatory response 
ranging from a hands off ‘self-regulatory’ approach to a 
more coercive ‘sanctioning’ role. Of note, the latter approach 
is more aligned with the regulatory pillar of institutions and 
the use of coercion to bring about compliance (Scott 2014).
In the UK, we would argue that the regulatory approach 
has witnessed a number of changes over time, perhaps in 
response to a dynamic financial sector landscape. We argue 
that the modifications in the regulatory approach have not 
only influenced the compliance culture, but also rendered 
having a stable compliance culture rather unachievable. 
Prior to the global financial crisis, the UK adopted an alleg-
edly ‘light touch’ regulation approach relying on industry 
self-regulation (Buller and Lindstrom 2013). During this 
period (i.e. before the global financial crisis 2007), a frame-
work for compliance culture was also proposed by the UK 
regulator (the Financial Services Authority (FSA) to ensure 
fair customer treatment. Towards this end, and recognising 
the importance of compliance culture, a tool was designed 
to measure compliance culture within individual firms, 
thus enforcing firms to ‘deliver fair consumer outcomes’ 
(FSA 2007, p. 3). The model (see Fig. 1) presented by the 
FSA includes key drivers of leadership, strategy, deci-
sion making, controls, recruitment and reward (FSA 2007, 
p. 21) which sets out a clear expectation of best practice 
and expectations of the regulators. However, in a more 
recent policy statement, a broader model with the specific 
inclusion of culture was discussed as “the PRA consider a 
variety of factors to identify failings in culture, including 
governance, incentives, risk awareness and the ability to 
challenge senior management” (PRA 2014, p. 4). This indi-
cates an ongoing evolution to identifying specific measures 
for culture by the regulator, perhaps indicating that ‘one 
size’ does not fit all. More recently, the regulator has com-
municated that they will work more within individual firms 
to review culture (FCA Annual report, 2015/2016) rather 
than undertaking industry-wide thematic reviews. Perhaps 
then, it is necessary for supervisors to avoid models and 
guidance, which may encourage a ‘tick the box’ approach 
Fig. 1  Culture framework (FSA 2007, p. 21)
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to compliance (and compliance culture). In contrast, Car-
retta et al. (2010) contend that the new relationship models 
between supervisors and banks need to be supported by 
organisational tools, which enable sharing of information 
between parties; to promote both the advisory function of 
supervisors and a partnership model, premised on coopera-
tion between the supervisory bodies and banks. This was 
considered necessary given the risks regarding ‘perfunc-
tory cosmetic’ compliance (Calcott 2010). However, it is 
worthwhile mentioning that the advantages of firms choos-
ing their own approach are also recognised, whereby they 
can draw on their own experience and reflect on individual 
circumstances to approach compliance (Rossi 2010). More 
recently, culture issues were revisited by the FCA whereby 
the regulator intends to impact compliance decisions within 
firms, and culture in the sector using mechanisms such as 
‘publicising examples of good behaviour’ (FCA 2016b). 
These ongoing changes to the regulatory approach highlight 
the compliance culture co-creation idea.
Furthermore, following the appointment of Andrew Bai-
ley as the FCA’s chief executive in 2016, media speculated 
another significant shift in the regulatory direction of the 
FCA. A shift in the regulatory approach that would will no 
longer be viewed as ‘enforcement-led’, or be based on ‘shoot 
first, ask questions later’.4 This marks a significant shift in 
defining compliance and hence legitimacy. Here, legiti-
macy is changing from being a static property, achieved by 
complying with law/regulations to a more dynamic process 
socially constructed by the regulator and firms (Suddaby 
et al. 2017).
Alternatively, the approach is based on ‘credible deter-
rence’ (FCA 2016b), whereby the regulator, the FCA, can 
adopt wider regulatory actions and become more proactive 
rather than reactive. This includes the following: taking away 
firms/individuals operating authorisation; issuing fines; issu-
ing public/messages warnings; and bringing cases to court,5 
and indeed continue to hold senior managers to account 
(FCA 2013).6 This change within the regulatory stance may 
in turn bring about isomorphic changes within the sectors’ 
‘compliance culture’ through the said coercive measures 
(which links back to Ayres and Brathwaite’s Enforcement 
Pyramid). Yet, given the high costs of compliance to the 
financial service sector in the UK, the problem of cosmetic/
minimal compliance presented in the literature (Jackson, 
2001; Crump 2007; Calcott 2010) are still relevant, and can 
hinder the isomorphic effect on the overall compliance cul-
ture within the sector. As such it might be the case that some 
firms’ have different response from the majority of firms 
within the sector. As noted by Lamin and Zaheer (2012), 
these responses can include denial (dismissal of allegation 
in the form of denial that the problem exist, or it was related 
to factors such as labour practices or contractors or denying 
responsibility as indicated by Sutton and Callahan 1987) or 
defiance (contesting accusation and challenging accuser).
Normative and Cultural Pressures, Legitimacy 
and Compliance
There are significant normative forces affecting profession-
als working within the financial industry and as such the 
compliance culture. This includes adherence to relevant pro-
fessional bodies’ codes of conduct/ethics (such as account-
ing and legal professional bodies), with threats of dismissal 
from professional membership for cases of non-adherence 
by affiliated individuals.7 Individual banking organisations 
usually also apply their own codes of conduct for employ-
ees, which reflects banks’ attempt to conform with industrial 
norms including recent expectation of boards and leadership 
taking ownership for company culture (FRC 2016). Within 
UK financial services, professionalisation and creation of 
compliance norm are facilitated through institutes such as 
the British Bankers Association (BBA) which has recently 
been superseded by the UK Finance group in July 2017. One 
way such bodies promote best practice is through mecha-
nism such as continuous professional development (CPD), 
and also facilitating discussion and communication of 
issues between forum members. Previously, the BBA have 
also called for “license to trade” qualifications (and asso-
ciated profession requirements/codes of conduct).8 More-
over, BASEL committee on banking supervision issued a 
framework of principles in 2005, on which they followed 
up through the Accounting Task Force in 2008 to assess 
the degree of implementation within the industry.9 Individ-
ual firms such as Barclays have set up ‘Compliance Acad-
emies’ (Compliance Exchange 2014), in an attempt to force 
4 A range of media articles discuss the appointment of Andrew Bai-
ley including: http://www.teleg raph.co.uk/finan ce/newsb ysect or/
banks andfi nance /12121 782/Andre w-Baile y-named -surpr ise-choic 
e-to-run-Finan cial-Condu ct-Autho rity.html accessed February 2016.
5 See enforcement actions at https ://www.fca.org.uk/about /enfor 
cemen t.
6 See https ://www.fca.org.uk/publi catio n/news/enfor cemen t-credi ble-
deter rence -speec h.pdf.
7 For example, strict adherence to codes of conduct and ethics apply 
from legal and accounting professions. See http://www.lawso ciety 
.org.uk/for-the-publi c/using -a-solic itor/code-of-condu ct/
 https ://www.icaew .com/en/techn ical/ethic s/icaew -code-of-ethic s/
icaew -code-of-ethic s.
8 See press release for details, https ://www.bba.org.uk/news/press 
-relea ses/bba-licen ce-to-trade -quali ficat ions-and-tough er-codes -of-
condu ct-will-stren gthen -trust -in-finan cial-marke ts/#.WLlDc dJXXZ 4.
9 See https ://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs1 13.htm.
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changes in culture through mechanisms of CPD. Bussman 
and Niemeczek (2017) provide empirical evidence to sup-
port the importance of ‘transfer in knowledge of norms’, 
when reviewing compliance through culture. Zaal et al. 
(2017) also highlight the importance of CPD and training 
within organisations, to ensure that employees understand 
‘rules’ (clarity) and what is acceptable and thus ‘sanction-
ability’ within an organisational structure, to improve overall 
integrity.
Most recently, there are directives to ‘audit’ culture, 
although guidance on this is in a developing stage (UK 
Finance 2017). This seems counter intuitive to the com-
ments by the FCA, whereby they consider that ‘culture may 
not be measurable’ (FCA 2017). However, despite this they 
have described various ‘levers’ that they consider to manage-
able including; ‘clearly communicated sense of purpose’, 
‘tone at the top’, ‘formal governance processes’, and ‘people 
related practice’ (FCA 2017). These measures (or levers, as 
described most recently by the FCA) have all emphasised 
and created an industry wide norm of compliance culture 
on both organisations (through codes of conduct) as well 
as through individuals (banking professionals). These indi-
viduals internalise a compliance culture to the organisations 
they work for and through their personal conduct, which 
should be compliant with professional bodies and educa-
tional institutions.
To shed further light on the complexity of the compliance 
culture, it would be useful to note that companies may comply 
with regulations through ‘getting by’ and ‘keeping the regula-
tors happy’ (Jackman 2001). Clearly, this cannot only occur 
through coercive pressures alone, but with normative pres-
sures, promoted by the regulators in the form of ‘manageable 
levers’ give a more meaningful reason to comply (FCA 2017). 
This could happen through developing a partnership between 
the ‘regulator and the regulated’ (Edwards and Wolfe 2005, 
p. 52). This link to a normative ethical framework was called 
for earlier in practitioner literature, with the need to prioritise 
an ethical motive within compliance culture (Newton 2001, 
p. 3). Highlighting the role of normative pressures, Duska 
(2011) contends that being ethical and following the law are 
not the same, as “It is not an adequate ethical standard to 
aspire to get through the day without being indicted” (Duska 
2011, p. 22). In effect, normative pressures play an active role 
in the social construction of the legitimation process (Suddaby 
et al. 2017), which affects the professional conduct of indi-
viduals and hence the existence of a compliance culture within 
firms. Here, as Human and Provan (2000) shows, the process 
of legitimation is “not a monolithic or universal construct but, 
rather, varied as the field matured and emphasized different 
aspects of the organizational network over time.” (Suddaby 
et al. 2017, p. 25).
Malloy (2003) identified two attitudes of firms to 
normative ethical pressures. The first, which adopts a 
consequentialist normative ethical model, represents one of 
the rational egoist profit maximisers, obeying laws and regu-
lations only when it is in the firm’s best economic interest, 
which serves particular stakeholders who are critical to the 
existence of the firm such as regulators and shareholders. 
This essentialist stance is more congruent with conceiving 
legitimacy as a property rather than a process. The second 
adopts a non-consequentialist normative model, where the 
firm abides with laws and beyond as matter of being duty 
bound and in good faith despite struggling with increasingly 
complicated and contradictory laws and regulation. Clearly, 
this attitude does not take into account any consequences 
regarding the firm or its affected stakeholder. Realistically, 
and paying attention that compliance can only happen at a 
cost (Malloy 2003), the model of the firm behaviour as a 
rational profit maximiser would have prevalence in reality, as 
managers analyse ‘regulation via a prism of costs and gains’ 
whilst appreciating the “commercial and reputational gains 
that can be extracted from effective compliance systems” 
(Gilad 2011, p. 310). However, the complexity of real world 
could make it difficult to make a compliance decision purely 
on cost vs ethical basis. Nielsen and Parker (2012) argue 
that compliance can be driven by three different motives: 
Economic (maximising economic utility), Social (earning 
approval and respect from stakeholders) and Normative 
(doing the right thing). Nielson and Parker (2012) suggest 
that each business would be holding a ‘plural of motives’ 
along this basis. Finally, the extant literature identifies that 
compliant behaviour might face certain barriers: perceived 
incentives to comply (incentives and sanctions, monitoring 
problems, and enforcement problems); willingness to com-
ply (information and cognition problems, attitude and belief 
problems and peer effects); and capacity to comply (includ-
ing resource and autonomy problems) (Weaver 2014). These 
views are consistent with considering that compliance could 
be based on a multiple dimension legitimacy notion, which 
is socially constructed by stakeholders including firms and 
regulators (Suddaby et al. 2017).
For other academics such as Harvey and Bosworth-
Davies (2013, p. 5), compliance is a matter of culture, which 
stands as ‘taken for granted’ and unquestioned values that 
become embedded within organisations to an extent when 
procedures/guidelines are no longer necessary. These models 
can be linked clearly to the literature around compliance cul-
ture, with the underlying commitment to compliance through 
improved organisational culture. Although the responsibil-
ity for compliance ultimately remains with the board, com-
pliance occurs naturally through the engagement of staff 
through normative ethical adoption of compliance culture. 
This is in direct contrast to ‘passive compliance’ whereby 
minimal compliance is sought at minimal expense in a ‘reac-
tive’ fashion, with no improvement of conduct of business 
(Crump 2007). This is also discussed by Zaal et al. (2017), 
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who highlight that there is a distinction between integrity 
and compliance, but that both approaches are relevant and 
complementary within organisations. Thus, if only ‘passive 
compliance’ is in place, and no integrity or normative ethi-
cal adoption of compliance culture, then compliance frame-
works will break down.
Here, as the literature review shows, compliance culture 
is a complicated concept, which is socially constructed by 
the interaction of financial institutions and the environ-
ment where they are operating. Thus, understanding such 
concept requires devising an analytical approach that pays 
attention to its dynamic and context-specific nature which 
determines how it is diffused in the field (Meidinger 1987). 
This research fills the gap in the extant literature by inves-
tigating compliance culture from the financial institutions 
perspective rather than regulator’s perspective only (O’Brien 
et al. 2014; Ring et al. 2016). The analysis here is under-
pinned by the institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983; Perezts and; Picard 2015; Fashola 2014) and varying 
notions of legitimacy (Suddaby et al. 2017). We pay atten-
tion to the isomorphic processes of coercion, mimetic and 
normative actions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and their 
legitimating effect. More specifically, this paper investigates, 
first, the role of coercion by the regulators (in the UK, the 
FCA) through issue of fines, and the resulting impact on the 
violators. Second, it investigates the resulting response from 
the violators and the impact on role of other financial institu-
tions (mimetic processes). Finally, the impact of normative 
responses are considered, by analysing the communication 
to stakeholders using messages about compliance culture. 
Inevitably, the paper demonstrates how this dynamic envi-
ronment impacts the very notion of what legitimacy is. This 
development and alignment to isomorphic processes have 
been summarised in Fig. 2.
Methodology
This paper undertakes a two-stage longitudinal in-depth 
website analysis of press releases of 23 non-compliant firms 
as well as the regulators’ in the period between 2013 and 
2016. Our data collection and analysis are consistent with 
Fig. 2  Linking isomorphic 
processes to research questions 
and analysis of data
Table 1  Sample coverage of sanctions
Year and total fines (all offences) Sample size, justification of coverage Further reading relating to fines
2013 £474,263,738 2013/2014
£587.6 M within our sample
Total fines for all offences 2013/14 is £1,976 M. 
Of this total £1,114 represents a combined fined 
across several banks relating to G10 spot foreign 
exchange. This has not been included in total analy-
sis, as related to systematic control issues across 
the sector (and further investigation of Barclays 
‘culture’ is covered in 2015/2016 review)
Fines excluding the combined fine total £862 M, so 
our sample represents 68% coverage
https ://www.fca.org.uk/news/news-stori es/2013-fines 
2014 £1,471,431,800 https ://www.fca.org.uk/news/news-stori es/2014-fines 
https ://www.fca.org.uk/news/press -relea ses/fca-fines 
-five-banks -%C2%A311-billi on-fx-faili ngs-and-
annou nces-indus try-wide
2015 £905,219,078 2015/2016
£823.0 M within our sample
Total fines for all offences 2015/2016 £927 M, so our 
sample represents 88.7%
https ://www.fca.org.uk/news/news-stori es/2015-fines 
2016 £22,216,446 https ://www.fca.org.uk/news/news-stori es/2016-fines 
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Snider et al. (2003) and Schreier (2012), whereby websites 
were selected based on the publicly available responses by 
firms fined (more than £0.5 million) by the FCA for compli-
ance culture failing, and also in contrast firms which have 
been praised by the regulator for their approach. Appendi-
ces 1 and 2 list the extracts from FCA press releases and 
extracts from the respective company websites. The sample 
was selected from sanctioned firms in 2013/2014 (Appen-
dix 1) and sanctioned firms in 2014 to 2016 (Appendix 2) 
relating to sanctions greater than £0.5 million and identify-
ing issues with compliance and culture. Table 1 summarises 
and justifies the sample coverage of sanctioned firms within 
our analysis. Appendices 3–5 have been included to identify 
a contrasting analysis of positive compliance culture high-
lighted by the FCA during the period within the ‘Best of 
British’ Speech (FCA 2014d). The sample here is a smaller 
number of firms as identified specifically by the FCA.10
As suggested by Snider et al. (2003) and Schreier (2012), 
analysis included the following steps: first, the contents of 
the press release headlines were reviewed and all cases with 
sanctions against firms or individuals were identified. Sec-
ond, the information was sorted and categorised resulting 
in the emergence of the following themes Coercive isomor-
phism—actions of the regulator pressuring violating banks; 
Mimetic isomorphism: violators’ regret statements; Norma-
tive isomorphism—learning, adapting, and collaborating in 
response to sanction; Normative isomorphism in endorsed 
firms. Our themes are indeed, driven from data analysis, 
based on constant comparison of one case to another (Snider 
et al. 2003; Strauss and Corbin 1990), but also guided by an 
existing theory i.e. institutional theory (Scott 2014). Stemler 
(2001) call these priori coding method, where categories/
themes are established based on some theory. This serves 
here as an additional measure of rigorousness as indicated 
by Harris (2001). It must be mentioned here that it was not 
the discovery of new theory but to explore the response of 
violators and investigate whether the institutional pressures, 
namely, coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism 
notion, could explain these responses. Thus, answering the 
research question: How is the UK financial institutions’ com-
pliance culture shaped by the institutional environment and 
changing legitimacy claims?
This is consistent with the objective of QCA as a widely 
used approached in analysing discursive data such webpages 
and press releases with the aim of “interpret meaning from 
the content of text data” (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, p. 1277). 
QCA is also widely used in mainstream management jour-
nals (for examples please see Hite et al. (1988); Harris 
(2001); Jose et al. (2007); Bodolica and Spraggon (2015)). 
Within QCA, the quality aspects of reliability and validity 
are carefully observed, which are qualities borrowed from 
quantitative research (Schreier 2012). To account for inter-
coder reliability, the researchers have followed Schreier’s 
(2012) advice regarding achieving consistency and reliabil-
ity by verifying the coding scheme by the first author revis-
iting the data and coding at three points of time as well as 
discussions between the two authors to see if there is differ-
ence in understanding that would affect the coding scheme. 
In addition, the authors have worked closely on the project 
as such have established shared meaning of the coding. In 
the case of any differences, each coder was asked to revisit 
the coding, then a discussion took place to reach final agree-
ment, as such, the categories included are those agreed by 
the two coders. According to Stemler (2001), there can be 
an element of agreement by a chance between the two cod-
ers; however, this risk was mitigated by (1) revisiting the 
themes by the coders at different points of time, (2) using 
theory aligned themes i.e. institutional theory driven, and 
(3) discussing any differences between the two coders, with 
the reported themes fully based on the shared understanding 
of the two coders.
Moreover, Schreier (2012) indicates that the coding 
scheme would be valid “to the extent that your categories 
adequately represent the concepts in your research ques-
tion” (p. 7). Here, the main themes of Coercive isomor-
phism—actions of the regulator pressuring violating banks; 
Mimetic isomorphism: violators’ regret statements; Norma-
tive isomorphism—learning, adapting, and collaborating in 
response to sanction; Normative isomorphism in endorsed 
firms are all valid in addressing the papers’ main question 
above. This paper expands and extends on Ring et al. (2016) 
qualitative study, which focussed on 1 year of regulatory 
sanction notices during 2012 (from a regulatory perspec-
tive), to an extended longitudinal review of institutional 
responses, incorporating institutional theory. This compares 
the public message of firms relating to compliance culture, 
10 As highlighted with Appendix  5 during our analysis, we found 
difficulty in identifying praise of specific firm’s culture/compliance 
by FCA. Usually we would expect to see highlights of ‘good prac-
tice’ in thematic reviews. However, within the 2015/16 annual report 
it was announced that “we considered that a thematic review would 
not be the most effective and efficient way to continue to support and 
drive continued culture change across the sector. Instead, we decided 
that the most effective way to achieve this was to continue to engage 
individually with firms, as well as supporting other initiatives out-
side the FCA. We have not changed our views about the importance 
of firm culture and we will continue our work with individual firms” 
(2015/2016 Annual Report). As an alternative method of analysis the 
annual reports were searched to review the emphasis on culture by 
the FCA year on year in Appendix 5. In order to identify examples of 
good practice (highlighted in Appendix 4) we have used firms identi-
fied within the ‘Best of British’ speech by Tracey McDermott (FCA 
2014d), these organisations were included as exemplars of good 
‘culture’ and ‘trust’ messages within the sector. Therefore, the press 
releases of Cooperative Bank, Nationwide, RBS and Virgin Money 
were selected as a sample. However, also to note that RBS was fined 
during 2014 as part of the wider, systemic LIBOR issues in 2014.
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compared to violations (and resulting fines) that have been 
reported recently by the FCA.
This is an alternate qualitative methodology to an earlier 
study by Carretta et al. (2005). Of note, this earlier study 
adopted a quantitative textual analysis on a sample of Ital-
ian banking groups to explore culture. However, the focus 
on language is in line with prior studies. Here, we follow 
Schein (1985) and DiMaggio (1997) whose work support 
the analysis of culture through expressed vocabulary and 
analysis of written text (Carretta et al. 2005, p. 19). Analysis 
has been focused on extracts from each of the company’s 
website, which were found using keywords such as ‘compli-
ance culture’, ‘culture’ and ‘risk management culture’.11 To 
contrast this review of sanctioned firms’ responses to the 
regulator, a small sample of ‘non-sanctioned’ firms was also 
performed, alongside an analysis of the regulator’s message 
of good ‘culture’ within their annual report (see appendix 
5) and publications.
Findings and Discussion
This section presents the findings, which are discussed in 
light of the institutional theory. The emphasis here is on 
exploring how the UK financial institutions’ compliance 
culture could be influenced by their interaction with the 
external institutional environment and in particular, the 
coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism processes, 
and how the legitimation process accompanying the shift in 
the institutional landscape has been impacted, as discussed 
in the following sections. Table 2 summarises key quotes 
which have been aligned to institutional forces. The table 
presents sub-themes which are discussed in the following 
sections in turn.
Coercive Isomorphism—Actions of the Regulator 
Pressuring Violating Banks
Analyses show that the FCA has issued significant amount of 
fines against non-complying firms in the period from 2013 
to 2016, in an attempt to coerce compliance and eventually 
create the so-called ‘compliance culture’. In fact, the FCA 
was highly critical of the compliance culture of the violating 
firms. Coding shows that there were four themes of com-
mentary from the FCA within the press releases. In the first 
theme, the FCA commented specifically on the deficiencies 
in the culture of the violating firms, while, in the second 
theme, the FCA commented on shortfalls in firms’ behaviour 
against their expectations. In addition, it was observed that 
the tone of FCA’s message changed to messages of coop-
eration in more recent releases (theme three). A final wor-
rying trend was noticed in a minority of cases reviewed, 
whereby the violating firms appeared to have disregarded 
the regulator’s pressures or attempted to blame others (theme 
four). The four themes are further discussed in the following 
subsections.
Table 3 summarises the data collected in this research, 
listing institutions highlighted in FCA press releases, and 
sanctioned in excess of £0.5 million, which demonstrates 
coercion by the regulator in the forms of fines/sanctions 
issued.
Theme 1: Culture Deficiencies
Whilst discussing culture issues, the FCA commented on the 
misdirection of firms focus on profits, revenues, transaction 
quantity, and remuneration rather than measures relating to 
customer protection. Table 2 provides examples of quotes 
1–4 as evidence of this theme in the press releases.
The regulator’s criticisms of culture align also to Malloy’s 
(2003) vision of the firm whereby firms act as rational profit 
maximisers, obeying laws and regulations, only when it is 
in the firm’s best economic interest (or in these cases, do 
not comply). It should also be acknowledged that in these 
instances, the coercive force of fines issued by the regulator 
is limited due to the ‘dysfunctional’ culture motivated by 
economic interests of revenue and profit generation.
Theme 2: Shortfall in Behaviours
The FCA also expressed ‘disappointment’ in their observa-
tions of these firms, and signal that the fines are as a result, 
and firms will “be held to account” if the FCA’s expecta-
tions are not met. Table 2 summarises quotes 5–10, which 
capture the regulator’s comments on behaviours and their 
disappointment thereon.
These quotes evidence the regulator’s coercive force, by 
communicating a regulatory stance which does not allow 
for shortcomings in firms’ performance against regulators 
expectations. There is an implicit tone that these behaviours 
are not tolerated, and action (sanction) and accountability 
must be taken within the violating firms.
Theme 3: Cooperative ‘Working Together’
In 2015, Martin Wheatley stepped down as CEO of the 
FCA and was replaced by Andrew Bailey early in 2016, 
indicative of a change in approach by the FCA. Therefore, 
11 Risk management and compliance are often seen as inextricably 
interlinked within the professional landscape in the UK, whereby 
compliance officer and risk manager are used for the role. However 
within the literature Haynes (2005) is critical of the overlaps of roles 
in some organisations, whereby roles of “risk management” and 
“risk based compliance” (and other control functions) should not be 
blurred.
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the second round of analysis during the 2015/16 coincided 
with a change in attitude and leadership within the FCA. 
This was evident in the tone of some of the press releases 
reviewed for this period (as discussed within the literature 
review). Whilst criticism was still apparent in certain cases, 
the FCA highlighted the positive relationships fostered 
with the firms to move past the issues. Table 2 summarises 
quotes 11–14 which evidence this change in tone to more 
‘proactive’ relationships and recognises the progress and 
action by firms.
The analysis of quotes 11–14 indicates that the FCA 
coercive stance has moved from a highly critical rhetoric, 
towards a movement of relationship building and collabo-
ration to encourage firms to modify their regulatory com-
pliance behaviours. This stance aligns also to the concept 
of legitimacy moving from an emphasis on legitimacy as 
property to a process through complementary involvement 
of all actors (Suddaby et al. 2017). Of note, legitimacy as 
a property or outcome will always remain core to policy 
objectives; however, the shift in emphasis on the process 
demonstrates a more and pragmatic approach that the regula-
tor has adopted as a means to an end i.e. state of legitimacy.
During our analysis, we found difficulty in identifying 
praise of specific firm’s good culture/compliance by the 
FCA i.e. non-sanctioned firms used as exemplars. Usually 
we would expect to sees highlights of ‘good practice’ in the-
matic reviews. However, within the 2015/16 annual report it 
was announced that:
we considered that a thematic review would not be the 
most effective and efficient way to continue to support 
and drive continued culture change across the sector 
[…] we will continue our work with individual firms 
(FCA 2015/16 Annual Report).
This extract does not detract from the ‘working together’ 
element. However, the lack of exemplars inhibits the impact 
of the regulators to coerce firms into adopting ‘good prac-
tice’ other than by use of sanction. More recently, FCA 
(2017) specifically calls for changes in culture and compli-
ance by ‘publicising good behaviours’. However, this does 
not seem observable in practice during this review, which 
also will inhibit the impact of mimetic and normative iso-
morphism within the sector (which we will discuss in fol-
lowing sections).
Table 3  List of significant fines 
during period of analysis Firm/violation (sourced via FCA press releases > 500K fine) Significance of fine £’million
2013/2014 review
 Wonga (FCA 2014) £2.8
 Martin Brokers (FCA 2014a) £0.6
 ICAP (FCA 2013) £14.0
 State Street Bank (FCA 2014b) £22.9
 Lloyds (FCA 2013) £28.0
 Homeserve (FCA 2014c) £30.6
 JP Morgan (FCA 2013d) £137.6
 JLT Speciality (FCA 2013c) £1.8
 Rabobank (FCA 2013f) £105.0
 Sesame (FCA 2013f) £6.0
2015/2016 review
 Threadneedle Asset Management Limited (FCA 2015) £6.0
 Barclays (relating to transaction in 2011/2012) (FCA 2015b) £72.0
 Barclays (forex failings 2008–2013) (FCA 2015d) £284.4
 CashEuroNet (FCA 2015k) £1.7 (note redress)
 Dollar financial UK (FCA 2015l) £15.4 (note redress)
 Cash genie (FCA 2015m) £20.0
 Lloyds banking group (PPI handling) (FCA 2015c) £117.0
 Deutsche bank (Libor and Euribor) (FCA 2015e) £227.0
 Merrill Lynch International (MLI) (FCA 2015f) £13.2
 Clydesdale bank (FCA 2015h) £20.6
 The Bank of New York Mellon London branch and The Bank of New 
York Mellon International Limited (FCA 2015h)
£126.0
 Bank of Beirut (FCA 2015i) £2.1
 Aviva investors (FCA 2015j) £17.6
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Theme 4: Disregard for the Regulatory Response
Interestingly, the issue of fines by the regulator, and resulting 
communication seems does not seem to be completely effec-
tive, as still some individual firms have not responded to 
coercion by the regulator. Worryingly, in three instances (out 
of selection of ten for 2013/14 review), the website search 
did not find a press release in response to the regulators 
fine. This may be the deliberate intention of the organisa-
tions not to advertise failings of the past and to focus on the 
future. However, it may also indicate an ongoing disregard 
of linkage of compliance culture and duty to stakeholder 
communication. In addition, Quote 15 in Table 2 is noted 
to be deliberately concise. In this instance, the organisation 
does not follow the pattern of expressing regret (see later 
discussion of mimetic responses), and states only confirma-
tion of ‘appropriate’ updates. This does not indicate a buy in 
by management of change in compliance culture within the 
organisation. Inherently, barriers to compliance may exist 
within these types of organisation through either an unwill-
ingness to engage (Weaver 2014) or a lack of partnership 
with the regulators (Jackman 2001; Carretta et al. 2010). 
Notably, this is another instance where regulatory actions 
(sanctions) have not resulted in adjusted public face by the 
firms in respect to their dysfunctional compliance culture. 
This supports Parker (2006) who suggested that there are 
inherent pitfalls faced by regulators in the form of the ‘deter-
rence trap’ and the ‘compliance trap’. The deterrence trap 
(where penalties are not sufficient to deter misconduct) is 
considered manageable through ‘skilful’ use of responsive 
regulation (Parker 2006, p. 593). The deterrence trap appears 
to apply in these cases where penalties have not deterred 
misconduct (or any apparent changes to behaviour). Despite 
significant fines and sanction from regulators, the high prof-
itably nature of the financial service industry may result in 
inappropriate behaviours for short-term gains. As exempli-
fied within Quote 16, the message within the press release 
seemed to indicate an attitude that ‘it’s not our fault’.
The tone of this press release would indicate that the firm 
had taken all necessary measures to avoid the issue; how-
ever, this conflicts with the imposed fine and the message 
from the regulator (see quote 17).
Therefore, this is not particularly transparent from the 
publics’ perspective. The size of the fine and the tone 
adopted by the regulator would indicate serious issues in 
this case. However, the firm portrays the message that the 
issue was outside of their control, and that they did all they 
could. This is confusing for the public when trying to inter-
pret this event, depending on whose viewpoint (the regulator 
or the firm) that they consider. This may indicate that this 
minority of firms have chosen to respond differently and 
follow a denial or defiance strategies (Lamin and Zaheer 
2012) that dismisses the need to follow suit by issuing regret 
statements, or to relate the incident to factors beyond the 
firms’ control.
Overall, the review of the responses to regulatory action 
does indicate that coercive isomorphism has impacted the 
sector in the reviewed period. The press releases demon-
strate the coercive pressure applied on violators, in the form 
of messages of culture deficiencies and shortfalls in expecta-
tions. There are also clear messages in the change of tone in 
both the regulatory response and the violators’ responses, 
in terms of cooperation. Positive movements indicating col-
laboration in working relationship become apparent in press 
releases that are more recent. More worrying is the attitude 
by a minority of the violators to apparently disregard the 
coercive forces. Still, the analysis shows that there is an 
isomorphic behaviour in response to this coercive pressure.
Mimetic Isomorphism: Violators’ Regret Statements
The idea of mimetic isomorphism was emphasised by 
Aldrich (1979) who considered that the most important fac-
tor that organisations must consider is other organisations, 
especially that competition between organisations is not only 
limited to customers and resources but also for “political 
power, institutional legitimacy... as well as economic fit-
ness” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p. 150). In this case, the 
study findings show that offending companies follow suit 
in terms of issuing statements, which would safeguard their 
reputation in the market place. The violating firms are seen 
to issue similar responses to the regulator’s sanction in the 
form of regret statements, in order to meet the expectations 
of their stakeholders, and to maintain their reputation and 
legitimacy in the market.
National and multinational companies install codes of 
conduct and internal policies in accordance with corporate 
governance ‘best practice’ guidance, depending on juris-
diction. The expectation is that the majority of employees 
and management conform to these expectations; however, 
there will be a minority of offenders who seek ‘profitability 
through illegal means or outright fraud which they ‘regret’ 
when getting caught’ (Verhezen 2010, p. 188). The fined 
organisations websites were reviewed for press releases in 
response to the regulators actions. It is therefore interesting 
to analyse the content of press releases under this viewpoint 
of regret within quotes 18–22 in Table 2.
As the level of these fines was significant in value, it 
attracted media attention and impacts the public agenda 
(McCarthy and Dolfsma 2014). Therefore, stakeholders will 
have an expectation of an apology or regret from the violators. 
Hence, the regret statements issued by violators in response to 
mimetic pressures are an approach to gain legitimacy follow-
ing transgression (Kondra and Hurst 2009, p. 40). This trend 
continued when further data were analysed for the period 
2015/16. In the review of violators’ websites, the majority had 
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released press statements in response to the regulators action. 
The expressions of regret and personal apology continued in 
some cases within the firm which corresponds to the earlier 
data from 2013/14, as illustrated in quotes 23–26.
The review performed on the later 2015/16 fines also indi-
cated a lack of emphasis on compliance culture within the 
firms outward facing publications (website and press release). 
However, it must be acknowledged that firms perhaps view 
this as embedded within their ‘corporate governance’ publi-
cations. Moreover, there were some exceptions (see quotes 
27–29 in Table 2) which comment specifically on compliance 
culture which may be viewed as a positive movement.
These messages are all positive towards culture. However, 
as highlighted by the former head of FSA (Hector Sants) 
it is nearly impossible for the regulator to ‘judge culture’ 
and indeed ‘enforce culture’ (O’Brien et al. 2014, p. 124). 
Instead, the focus of the regulator should be on the behav-
iours and outcomes demonstrated by the firms, and how 
culture delivers within these firms (FCA 2016b). This also 
aligns to the concept of legitimacy formed in a complemen-
tary fashion (Suddaby et al. 2017), whereby both ‘product’ 
in the form of observable behaviours and ‘process’ in the 
form of continued collaboration between the parties are 
an element of moving compliance culture towards a more 
legitimate form. Whilst these messages in press releases are 
all position firms as fostering good culture, the evidence of 
continued misdemeanour within the firms indicates worry-
ing trends for the regulator.
This review of the responses of the violators indicates 
mimetic isomorphism has impacted the sector in the 
reviewed period. Overall, there is a theme of ‘regret’ state-
ments being released by violating firms following sanctions, 
in an attempt to regain legitimacy within the market place, 
and amongst their stakeholders.
Normative Isomorphism—Learning, Adapting 
and Collaborating in Response to Sanction
Normative isomorphism leads to the adoption of similar 
practices amongst organisations within the same organisa-
tional field as a response to normative pressures. It highlights 
the impact of normative rules (values and norms) that lead 
to convergence through socialisation. Here the violators’ 
press releases and webpages have been interrogated for evi-
dence of responses to these pressures to conform to expec-
tations of professional norms and concepts of best practice 
from the industry. In the majority of cases, there is indica-
tion of ‘learning’ and ‘process change’ within the organi-
sation which would align to the concepts of re-education 
and re-professionalisation, in line with normative pressure. 
An alternative approach is adopted in some press releases 
whereby the organisations argue that change in organisation 
supersedes these events. The statements continue to reflect 
conformity with expectations and norms of stakeholders, as 
exemplified within quotes 30–33 in Table 2.
Although not evidenced specifically, there would be an 
expectation of improved controls/processes/codes of con-
duct in line with industry expectations (set out by BBA dur-
ing period of review, and more recently UK Finance 2017). 
Given the statements above from the violating firms’ press 
releases, we argue that the overall message of learning and 
improvement, communicated in the above quotes, is indeed 
reflective of changes in companies’ policies and systems and 
would result in re-professionalisation through further inter-
nal training and education.
Direct actions have also been demonstrated in the res-
ignation of the Chairman as in the case of Rabobank, for 
instance. Moreover, other organisations have demonstrated 
change via appointment of a new Risk Officer, as in the 
case of Sesame. These publicised events could be linked to 
the social aspects motivating compliance to earn approval 
and respect (Nielson and Parker 2012) via direct action to 
enhance compliance. The publicised events are a direct 
attempt by violating firms to ‘restore’ reputation and legiti-
macy in the industry. On a related note, Barclays Bank has 
also recently publicised improvements to compliance train-
ing following issue of fines by both the UK and US regula-
tor. This again gives an example of direct publicised action 
as an attempt to improve the bank’s track record in adhering 
to professional norms (Compliance Exchange 2014).
Normative Isomorphism Evidenced in Endorsed 
(Legitimate) Firms
The results of these actions have been compared to firms, 
which have not been sanctioned during the period, and in 
contrast have been ‘endorsed’ by the regulators. Within the 
review of non-sanctioned firms, there was also evidence of 
signalling by the entities to the FCA and wider stakehold-
ers, of their continued conformity with normative expecta-
tions. Several of these firms were praised by the FCA in the 
‘Best of British’ speech (FCA 2014d), for initiatives within 
the sector promoting trust, fairness and integrity. Despite 
these endorsements, it was acknowledged that several of 
these institutes have come under scrutiny from the regula-
tor in the past (Cooperative Bank, 2012 Capital structure 
issues12; RBS, during the financial crisis13; with Virgin 
12 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/busin ess-33859 015for discussion 
of the capital shortfall issues in the bank, and the regulators criticism 
of the institute without official sanction.
13 There are ongoing criticism of both the role of management of 
RBS and the then regulator the FSA within media coverage. http://
www.teleg raph.co.uk/finan ce/newsb ysect or/banks andfi nance /89501 
15/RBS-repor t-poor-decis ions-by-manag ement -and-FSA-blame d-for-
failu re.html and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/busin ess-41652 883pro-
vide further background to this case.
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Money stepping in to take over the troubled Northern Rock 
during the financial crisis).14
In the press release, there is clear signalling of updates 
to ‘normative’ levers such as announcement of codes of 
conduct/ethical policy updates, and strengthening of gov-
ernance oversight. Specifically, in the case of Cooperative 
Bank, there are numerous updates within press release of 
strengthening of the board, with a new Chief Executive 
and Deputy announced in 2013. Virgin Money also signals 
the strengthening of the board as seen in Table 2, quotes 
34–35.
This meets normative aspects of presenting as strong 
board and governance structure; however, this differs from 
the direct (and reactive) actions required by the sanctioned, 
or troubled firms. The emphasis is on the word ‘continue’ 
whereby they signal that there is continuous improvement 
within the company. This press release indicates a strength-
ening of the internal senior management, unaffected by 
external forces/events to trigger change as evidenced in the 
use of word ‘continue’.
Whilst reviewing the press statements of RBS, there was 
acknowledgement of previous failings which evidences 
mimetic ‘regret statements’, which echo the response of 
sanctioned banks.
However, RBS also align to normative signalling of 
‘learning’ and improvements to controls and structures, 
which is comparable to the response of sanctioned banks.
Alongside these signals within the sanctioned and non-
sanctioned firms of alignment with normative expectations, 
there has also been clearer expectations set out by the FCA. 
During the period under review, the regulators have jointly 
issued the ‘Senior Managers Regime’ (Ernst and Young 
2014), which promotes accountability of senior manage-
ment (at the top of organisation) for regulatory compliance 
(replacing the Approved Persons Regime). This requires 
firms to have ‘Responsibility Maps’ in allocating govern-
ance and management responsibilities. In addition, any 
employee within organisations with responsibilities relating 
to regulated activities, must also engage in the ‘Certification 
Regime’. The purpose of these requirements is to change 
the norm of good practices and hence impact compliance 
culture (Ernst and Young 2014). Despite the changes to the 
regulator and the ‘changing set of rule books’, the  desired 
changes for accountability may not be realised if the regula-
tor continue to have ‘little appetite’ to ensure responsibility 
within the banks (Haynes 2014). There were also positive 
messages of collaborative working relationships with the 
regulator to adopt the normative best practices as set by the 
regulator to underpin regulatory reforms. As Scott (2014) 
suggests, establishing these norms is effective in enhanc-
ing compliance, as it creates a logic of ‘appropriateness’ 
which complements the logic of ‘instrumentality’ of regu-
lations. This can be demonstrated within quotes 38–40 by 
financial institutions in response to the normative regulator’s 
perspective.
Moreover, these quotes indicate a healthy movement of 
collaboration within the working relationship between the 
regulators and the banks supporting Edward and Wolfe’s 
(2004) partnership model. Indeed, this is also an example 
of complying with the pressure of adopting ‘best prac-
tice’ approach to regulatory relationship, as endorsed by 
the regulator and industry working groups (UK Finance 
2017). Normative pressures would also include adoption 
of best practice codes of conduct endorsing culture across 
the firm (FRC 2016). Here, analysis has shown that sev-
eral organisations did allow open access to the code of 
conduct.
To summarise, normative pressures facing violators 
do appear to result in isomorphism, as evidenced through 
acknowledgement of learning and change required within 
the violating firms. However, these actions will result in 
long-term strategic initiatives (such as new training pro-
gram adopted by Barclays) rather than purely short-term 
responses. Therefore, whilst there are some instances of 
direct action to evidence re-professionalisation through new 
leadership, or new processes, these will result in longer-term 
impact within the organisations (in comparison to the ear-
lier discussed pressures and responses from a coercive and 
mimetic perspective). There are similarities evident in both 
sanctioned and non-sanctioned firms in how they signal their 
alignment to normative expectations of the regulator and 
wider sector. All actors may attribute this signalling to the 
pursuit of legitimacy.
Table 4 summarises the coercive, mimetic and normative 
pressures and associated organisational responses discussed 
in this section and earlier within the literature review.
A State of ‘Evolutionary Compliance’?
Underpinned by institutional theory (Scott 2014), the 
overall finding of this study can be summarised in Fig. 3 
as a state of evolutionary compliance. Here, the public 
face of the majority of violators’ websites did not recon-
cile fully with the concept of compliance culture indicated 
in Fig. 1, issued by the FSA/FCA as an earlier attempt 
to promote clearer vision, transparency, and communi-
cation as essential attributes driving compliance culture 
within the firm. The compliance culture messages of the 
organisations selected within this review did not appear 
to be transparent or easily searchable within the compa-
nies’ public face—the companies’ webpages. As presented 14 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/busin ess-15769 886.
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in the findings, the majority of the firms have expressed 
regret statements, following regulatory sanctions, which 
is in line with stakeholder expectations. However, it may 
be arguable what they do regret—the original misdemean-
ours, or getting caught?
It is difficult to gauge the compliance models adopted 
within the violating firms as the transparency of the compli-
ance culture message is weak in all cases, as evident from 
the extensive website review and analysis. However, given 
the regulators stance and fines imposed it may be assumed 
that the firms are all demonstrating negative attributes of 
compliance culture within their selected compliance func-
tion models. The actions of the selected violators are also 
argued to align more towards the coercive aspect of insti-
tutional theory, under the formal pressures exerted by the 
regulators. Thus, they have acted reactively, issuing regret 
statements in response to the fine, rather than proactively as 
a measure of self-regulatory controls.
As shown in Fig. 3, the violating firms in the sector are 
in a state of cyclical ‘evolutionary compliance’ rather than 
the more widely recognised state of ‘compliance culture’. 
All firms within the sector are subject to institutional pres-
sures, with coercive forces set by the tone of the regulator, 
and the wider media which represents public voice. Indeed, 
there are similarities noted in the press releases of non-sanc-
tioned firms to the sanctioned firms to align to normative 
pressure. Evolutionary compliance is heavily influenced 
by normative forces and the underlying theoretical litera-
ture base on compliance approach, which drives education 
and CPD within the profession. Finally, and most specifi-
cally identified in cases of non-compliance, mimetic forces 
are evident in the form of regret statements and structural 
reform, to restore legitimacy in the sector. Underpinning the 
model is an assumption that there is a dysfunctional culture 
within the industry due to competing economic motivations, 
which weakens evolutionary compliance through isomorphic 
change.
In addition, the perceived actions of violators cannot be 
linked to any one model of compliance behaviour which 
indicates a divide between the academic literature and 
the world of practice. Discrete and polar actions are often 
described in academic models which were discussed in the 
earlier literature review on anti and pro compliance (Jenkin-
son 1996); partnership with the regulator (or lack of partner-
ship?) (Edwards and Wolfe 2004); two visions of ‘rational 
profit maximisers’ and ‘law abiding actors (Malloy 2003); 
and economic, social and normative’ models (Nielson and 
Parker, 2012). This leads to a complexity in normative forces 
and consequent firm responses, due to regulatory uncertainty 
and thus definition of what is the compliance ‘best practice’ 
and education. Moreover, there is a complexity created by 
regulatory flux, whereby the regulatory landscape is con-
stantly evolving and as such this can lead to weakness of Ta
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mimetic forces, as firms are uncertain who and what to fol-
low in terms of ‘compliance culture’.
The significant theoretical contribution of this paper 
is to present the model for evolutionary compliance. This 
interlinks to underpinnings of institutional theory by high-
lighting the alignment of the regulatory pendulum, and thus 
the cyclical emphasis of isomorphic forces. Thus, it can be 
observed in the case of the regulator, even in the period 
under review there has been a changeover from emphasis 
on coercive style of regulator (with significant fines issued 
following the financial crisis), to an emphasis on normative 
pressures on firms in recent years. The regulator themselves 
highlight the point in their annual report 2015/16 whereby:
Regulatory arbitrage, at least in the conduct arena, is a 
game no longer worth playing […] to give credit where 
it is due, much of this is the result of firms’ efforts to 
improve their business models and culture to meet our 
expectations FCA Annual Report, 2015/16, p. 6.
We must mention here that the change in the regulatory 
approach has marked a change in the legitimation process 
from mainly being driven by legitimacy achieved through 
the coercive pressures of legally sanctioned rules to a more 
collaborative dynamic legitimation process (Suddaby et al. 
2017). Here, legitimacy is more process oriented and out-
come focused, in comparison to being outcome focused only 
under the older regulatory approach. This means that the 
definition of legitimacy and the process to achieve is now 
more dynamic and interactive. This interactive process of 
collaboration between the regulator and both non-comply-
ing and complying firms is evident in the data analysed in 
this paper (and directly in the quote above from the FCA’s 
annual report). The current regulatory and firm approach 
to compliance culture is reliant on an agenda of transpar-
ent communication between the multiple actors within the 
sector. As evidenced in the evolutionary compliance model, 
the balance of the isomorphic forces has changed over time, 
and this interlinks directly with the resulting flux in the con-
cept of legitimacy within the sector. Thus, out of the three 
institutional pressures discussed, normative and mimetic 
pressures are gaining higher prominence in the evolutionary 
compliance culture, while the coercion is relegated. Of note, 
here the change in the legitimation process has an impor-
tant implication on enhancing a substantive change in the 
policies and practices of financial institutions. As Zajac and 
Westphal (1995) indicated that firms can take “an action that 
is partly or even largely symbolic, representing a possible 
decoupling of actual... practices from formal arrangements” 
(P. 367). In the context of this paper, this would simply mean 
that regret statements do not constitute any real changes 
in practices, but only represent a symbolic statement that 
attempts to manipulate the reader. This could be possible 
if legitimacy is regulatory driven and firms can issue state-
ments with the aim to ‘tick-the-box’, however, with a more 
process orientated, dynamic, and outcome orientated legiti-
mation, decoupling becomes tougher than ever.
Fig. 3  The interplay of coer-
cive, mimetic and normative 
forces impacting evolutionary 
compliance, offset by dysfunc-
tional culture in offending firms
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Next Steps–Embracing a ‘Holistic’ Approach 
to Compliance
The paper argues for a holistic approach for compliance, 
defining holistic whereby key actors have to work together 
cooperatively to achieve progress regarding compliance. 
More specifically, compliance officers have to work closely 
with regulators, internally within the firm and also externally 
with other firms within the sectors to make this happen. The 
need for this holistic approach links to the change in the 
legitimation process, which is now outcome focussed and 
requires collaboration between firms and the regulator. It is 
also holistic, as the identification of the objectives of com-
pliance is related to a wide range of stakeholders’ interests, 
which should be considered and embedded. As such, the 
model of evolutionary compliance implicitly implies that 
within the real-world financial services the concept of a 
holistic approach towards regulatory compliance is adopted 
by all relevant actors in order to move towards compliance 
culture. Those that fail to adopt the spirit of regulation, and 
fail to understand the wider implication of their compliance 
approach on the wider sector will inevitably fail within the 
evolutionary cycle.
Conclusion, Limitations and Future Research
This study shows that there is a state of evolutionary compli-
ance culture fuelled by three institutional pressures. Firstly, 
the study shows that coercive isomorphism has impacted 
the sector in the reviewed period. Whereby the regulator 
has issued fines as well as messages of culture deficiencies 
and shortfalls in expectations. This has coerced the violating 
companies to respond by issuing similar messages of regret 
and structural changes regarding moving towards a com-
plain culture promoted by the regulator. On a related note, 
in some cases, we have observed that the issue of fines by 
the regulator, and resulting communication seems to be not 
completely effective, as still some individual firms have not 
responded to coercion by the regulator. This could be attrib-
uted to firms acting in a profit maximising capacity, with 
economic motivations outperforming the coercive, mimetic 
and normative pressures. This could be linked in this study, 
to the concept of the deterrence trap introduced by Parker 
(2006), or simply that this minority of firms have chosen to 
respond differently and follow a defiance or denial strategy 
(Lamin and Zaheer 2012), that dismisses the need to follow 
suit by issuing regret statements or relate transgression to 
factors beyond the firm’s control, respectively.
The study shows that the regulator and financial institu-
tions interact in what can best be described as an ongoing 
evolution of a compliance culture. Here, there is a change 
of tone in both the regulatory and the violators’ responses, 
in terms of cooperation. Positive movements indicating 
collaboration in working relationship become apparent in 
more recent press releases. Secondly, the study shows that 
the regulatory pressures are underpinned by a concurrent 
normative pressure leading to violators’ acknowledgement 
of learning and change required. In effect, these actions will 
result in long-term strategic initiatives (such as new train-
ing program adopted by Barclays) rather than purely short-
term responses. Therefore, whilst there are some instances 
of direct action to evidence re-professionalisation through 
new leadership, or new processes, these will result in longer-
term impact within the organisations (in comparison to the 
earlier discussed pressures and responses from a coercive 
and mimetic perspective). Thirdly, the study shows that there 
is a mimetic isomorphic pressure, which entice violators to 
follow suit in terms of issuing statements that would safe-
guard their reputation in the market place. The violating 
firms are seen to issue similar responses to the regulators 
sanction in the form of regret statements, to meet the expec-
tations of their stakeholders, and to maintain their reputation 
and legitimacy in the market. However, legitimacy is now 
defined within an interactive process mainly between the 
regulator and firms. This could be useful in avoiding ticking 
the box compliance culture and could mean that the regula-
tory approach is more pragmatic, and hence, could be more 
responsive to the dynamic business environment, where the 
compliance culture continues to evolve.
This study has shown the interplay between the regulators 
and violating firms to address the overall research question; 
How is the UK financial institutions’ compliance culture 
shaped by the institutional environment and changing legiti-
macy claims? Compliance culture remains an area of con-
cern for the regulator, on which they have clearly reacted in 
the form of sanctions, and issue of policy guidelines, practi-
tioners continue to flaunt the rules despite continued public 
and media attention (Yeung 2002; Zubic and; Sims 2011). 
It has been observed that public awareness of these fines is 
largely controlled by media interest, which is then seen to 
impact public agenda and risk perceptions (McCarthy and 
Dolfsma 2014). Based on above discussion, the main conclu-
sion here is that the violating firms in the sector are in a state 
of cyclical ‘evolutionary compliance’ rather than the more 
widely recognised state of ‘compliance culture’.
This paper is not without limitations. As acknowledged 
within the introduction a pragmatic approach was adopted, 
with an exploratory in-depth review of both the regulator 
and a longitudinal sample of violating firms’ websites to 
carry out an initial study around the issue of compliance 
culture. The longitudinal nature of this review has spanned 
a change in the approach by the regulator from the ‘shoot 
first, ask questions later approach’. Further empirical evi-
dence will need to be gathered in order to present con-
ceptual models to the academic community. Some of the 
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themes identified within our qualitative review may be com-
plimented by future quantitative analysis. One such area, 
would be to explore the FCA’s criticism of the focus on 
profits and revenues within violating firms, and whether such 
measures are indeed an indicator of compliance breakdown. 
Another potential area to complement this paper would be 
to review data on other specific governance indicators (such 
as ownership structures, appointment of independent direc-
tors) in order to measure the changes that influence compli-
ance culture. Therefore, this paper calls for future research 
into this area, including contribution from practitioners, in 
order to address the gap between academic literature and 
practice. As this is a particularly sensitive area, alongside 
the quantitative data collection suggested above, this area 
would also benefit from data collected within a qualitative 
interview setting with practitioners. In addition, the focus of 
this paper has been on the UK regulator/banking sector rela-
tionship. Although many of the institutions are multinational 
in nature, their ‘public face’ may vary between jurisdictions. 
There are also ongoing scandals across different regulatory 
regimes indicating that the compliance culture problem is an 
ongoing issue. For example, the breadth of non-compliance 
evidenced in the recent case in Wells Fargo (which resulted 
in $185 million fine, and termination of employment of 
5,300 employees) would indicate an interesting avenue for 
case study research in this area of compliance culture.15 In 
addition, given recent calls for the audit of culture in the 
sector (UK Finance 2017), this is an interesting avenue for 
future research, when the industry will be required to report 
directly to the regulator in future.
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Appendix 2 2015/2016 Review 2015 
Onwards
This review involved interrogation of all FCA press release 
based on date i.e. 2014/2015/2016. The contents of press 
release headlines were reviewed and in cases where sanc-
tions against firms or individual were identified, these 
articles were reviewed further (when quote fines greater than 
£500K). In 2015 a total of 654 press releases were reviewed. 
These were further refined to review fines of over £500K 
related to firms providing financial services. In addition, 
items relating to redress to customers greater than £0.5m 
were also noted.
Firm/violation
(sourced via FCA press 
releases > 500K fine)
What the FCA said Firms compliance/culture message Website source
Threadneedle Asset 
Management Limited 
(TAML) fined £6.0 m 
(FCA 2015a)
“The FCA considers these failings 
to be particularly serious because 
the deficiencies allowed a fund 
manager to initiate, execute and 
book a $150 million trade which, 
had it settled, could have caused a 
$110 million loss to the relevant 
client funds.”
Press Release: “Threadneedle Asset Management 
Ltd notes today’s statement and financial penalty 
issued by the Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA). In August 2011 Threadneedle was the 
intended victim of an attempted fraudulent 
trade involving collusion between a Threadnee-
dle employee, an external broker and an FSA 
regulated entity. Threadneedle identified and 
stopped the trade and reported it to the FSA. 
There was no loss to Threadneedle or any client 
of Threadneedle. The employee concerned was 
dismissed.”
No search functionality exists (at time of review 
Feb 2016)
No particular messages on compliance culture 
evident other than a general section on corporate 
responsibility.
http://www.colum biath readn eedle 
.com/en/media -centr e/
Barclays fined £72.0 m 
(relating to transaction 
in 2011/2012)
(FCA 2015b)
“Barclays applied a lower level of 
due diligence than its policies 
required for other business rela-
tionships of a lower risk profile. 
Barclays did not follow its stand-
ard procedures, preferring instead 
to take on the clients as quickly 
as possible and thereby generated 
£52.3 million in revenue.”
“Barclays ignored its own process 
designed to safeguard against 
the risk of financial crime and 
overlooked obvious red flags to 
win new business and generate 
significant revenue. This is wholly 
unacceptable.
Firms will be held to account if 
they fail to minimise financial 
crime risks appropriately and for 
this reason the FCA has required 
Barclays to disgorge its revenue 
from the Transaction."
Press release:
“Barclays has cooperated fully with the FCA 
throughout and continues to apply significant 
resources and training to ensure compliance with 
all legal and regulatory requirements.”
See row below.
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Firm/violation
(sourced via FCA press 
releases > 500K fine)
What the FCA said Firms compliance/culture message Website source
FCA fines Barclays 
£284.4m (forex failings 
2008–2013)
FCA (2015a, d)
"This is another example of a firm 
allowing unacceptable practices 
to flourish on the trading floor. 
Instead of addressing the obvious 
risks associated with its business 
Barclays allowed a culture to 
develop which put the firm’s 
interests ahead of those of its 
clients and which undermined the 
reputation and integrity of the UK 
financial system. Firms should 
scrutinise their own systems and 
cultures to ensure that they make 
good on their promises to deliver 
change."
“Barclays and other firms are 
already participating in an indus-
try-wide remediation programme 
to ensure that they address the 
root causes of the failings in 
their FX businesses and that they 
drive up standards. As part of the 
remediation programme, senior 
management at Barclays and the 
other firms must take responsibil-
ity for delivering the necessary 
changes.”
Press release:
“The misconduct at the core of these investigations 
is wholly incompatible with Barclays’ purpose 
and values and we deeply regret that it occurred. 
This demonstrates again the importance of our 
continuing work to build a values-based culture 
and strengthen our control environment. We 
remain completely committed to that effort.
I share the frustration of shareholders and 
colleagues that some individuals have once 
more brought our company and industry into 
disrepute. Dealing with these issues, including 
taking the appropriate disciplinary action against 
the individuals involved, is a necessary and 
important part of our plan to transform Barclays 
and remains a key priority.”
Search on “compliance culture” directs you to 
2014 Transform site linking strategic direction of 
improving conduct.
https ://www.home.barcl ays/
about -barcl ays/strat egy/strat 
egy-and-opera ting-envir onmen 
t.html#marke t
CashEuroNet (trading as 
QuickQuids and Pounds 
to Pockets) redress 
£1.7m (FCA 2015k)
“The FCA has been working with 
the firm since it took over regula-
tion of consumer credit on 1 April 
2014. An independent Skilled 
Person was appointed in Septem-
ber 2014 to review CashEuroNet’s 
lending decisions which revealed 
that some customers were able to 
borrow amounts greater than they 
could afford to repay.”
“We are pleased that CashEuroNet 
is working with us to address our 
concerns.
It is important that firms carry out 
appropriate affordability checks 
and pay particular attention to 
fair treatment of those who have 
trouble meeting their loan repay-
ments.”
Press release
“We appreciate the opportunity to work with 
the FCA and the Skilled Person to review our 
processes, and we are pleased they’ve witnessed 
how seriously we take our regulatory responsi-
bilities and our constant desire to achieve good 
outcomes for our customers,” said Nick Drew, 
UK Managing Director. “We apologise to the 
4,000 affected customers, and we are pleased 
to be able to address this with the announced 
redress plan.”
https ://www.quick quid.co.uk/faq.
html
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Firm/violation
(sourced via FCA press 
releases > 500K fine)
What the FCA said Firms compliance/culture message Website source
Dollar Financial UK 
(trading as The Money 
Shop, Payday UK, Pay-
day Express and Ladder 
Loans) redress £15.4m
(FCA 2015l)
“The review revealed that many 
customers were lent more than 
they could afford to repay. The 
firm has since agreed to make a 
number of changes to its lending 
criteria in order to meet the FCA’s 
requirements for high-cost short-
term lenders.”
“The FCA expects all credit provid-
ers to carry out proper checks to 
ensure that borrowers don’t take 
on more than they can afford to 
pay back. We are encouraged that 
Dollar is committed to putting 
things right for its customers.”
Press release:
“As the new CEO of Dollar Financial UK, I accept 
the findings of the review and apologise to 
anyone who may have suffered difficulties as a 
result. It is proper that we put things right where 
they have gone wrong and I have gone further 
than the review in reforming the way our busi-
ness operates to reflect the company aim of being 
the most responsible lender in its market place.” 
said Chief Executive Stuart Howard.
Under corporate governance banner compliance 
search revealed:
“Our governance arrangements and standards 
also ensure that our businesses are managed 
in accordance with the relevant legislative and 
regulatory requirements and the policies and 
standards of our group. Compliance with these 
standards enables us not only to meet the expec-
tations of the regulator, but also those of other 
key stakeholders such as customers, employees 
and business partners.”
http://www.dolla ruk.com/
Cash Genie to provide 
£20 million redress
(FCA 2015m)
“We have been encouraged that 
Cash Genie has been working 
with us proactively and openly to 
put things right for its customers 
after these issues were reported.
Although standards in the consumer 
credit sector are improving, it 
is disappointing that examples 
of poor practice in the payday 
market keep surfacing. We expect 
all firms to notify us of any unac-
ceptable past or current practices 
and provide appropriate redress to 
anyone affected.”
An entire section of the webpage is devoted to 
information on the redress, demonstrating trans-
parency to customers.
Company in liquidation and no longer trading. No 
other information on the public website regard-
ing compliance/governance.
http://www.cashg eniec omms.co.uk/
Lloyds Banking Group 
fined £117m (PPI 
handling)
FCA 2015c)
“Lloyds has made significant 
progress towards the fairer treat-
ment of customers in its general 
complaint handling operation 
and has established an extensive 
remediation programme to re-
review or automatically uphold 
approximately 1.2 million PPI 
complaints, including those 
within the relevant period. Lloyds 
has set aside a total of £710m to 
cover any redress due to affected 
customers. Customers do not 
need to take any action. Those 
affected and due redress are being 
contacted directly. The FCA has 
appointed an independent skilled 
person to oversee the remediation 
process.
Lloyds announced in February 
2015 that it had decided to freeze 
the release of shares in respect of 
deferred bonus awards from 2012 
and 2013 for all members of the 
Group Executive Committee and 
for some other senior executives 
as a result of the FCA’s Enforce-
ment investigation.”
Nothing related to PPI issue found under press 
release area (despite FCA’s statement regarding 
Feb 2015 announcement.)
However, there is a dedicated section on updates 
on customer complaints (including PPI).
Dedicated information on corporate governance 
and role of boards.
http://www.lloyd sbank inggr oup.
com/our-group /our-custo mers/
compl aints -jan---jun-2015/
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Firm/violation
(sourced via FCA press 
releases > 500K fine)
What the FCA said Firms compliance/culture message Website source
Deutsche Bank fined 
£227 m (Libor and 
Euribor)
FCA 2015e)
“This case stands out for the 
seriousness and duration of the 
breaches by Deutsche Bank – 
something reflected in the size 
of today’s fine. One division at 
Deutsche Bank had a culture of 
generating profits without proper 
regard to the integrity of the mar-
ket. This wasn’t limited to a few 
individuals but, on certain desks, 
it appeared deeply ingrained.”
“This misconduct involved at least 
29 Deutsche Bank individuals 
including managers, traders and 
submitters, primarily based in 
London but also in Frankfurt, 
Tokyo and New York.”
“This misconduct went unchecked 
because of Deutsche Bank’s 
inadequate systems and controls. 
Deutsche Bank did not have any 
systems and controls specific 
to IBOR and did not put them 
in place even after being put on 
notice that there was a risk of 
misconduct.”
No press release found on UK site (however, this 
may be due to the structure of webpage and 
country level).
Website search indicated 298 matches for compli-
ance culture in the Deutsche Bank corporate web 
page.
Top match is the appointment of Global head of 
compliance in 2014 (prior to scandal)
“We welcome Nadine Faruque to Deutsche Bank 
and look forward to working with her on our 
vital Compliance agenda. We place the highest 
value on maintaining strong controls that are 
based on the values of discipline and integrity. 
Nadine’s leadership will help to shape our 
Bank’s future.”
Values and principles specifically highlights com-
pliance culture:
“We place great value on a positive compliance 
culture: We expect our employees to conduct 
themselves responsibly, honestly and with integ-
rity. Our code of conduct and ethics describes 
our values and our minimum requirements for 
ethical business conduct.”
https ://www.db.com/unite dking dom/
https ://www.db.com/cr/en/concr 
ete-respo nsibl e-gover nance 
.htm?dbiqu ery=null%3Acom plian 
ce+cultu re
Merrill Lynch Inter-
national (MLI) fined 
£13.2m
(FCA 2015f)
“The size of the fine—the highest 
imposed for transaction report-
ing failures to date - reflects the 
severity of MLI’s misconduct, 
failure to adequately address the 
root causes over several years 
despite substantial FCA guidance 
to the industry and a poor history 
of transaction reporting compli-
ance, consisting of a Private 
Warning issued in 2002 and a fine 
of £150,000 in 2006.”
No results found for press release on topic (via 
Bank of America pages/Merrill Lynch search). 
However, this may be as a result of the diluted 
structure of the webpage between countries.
No documents found under search for “compliance 
culture”. A search for “compliance” revealed 
123 results, however, these appeared to relate to 
employee roles.
Difficult to find governance messages, as the 
Merrill Lynch page is devoted to selling ser-
vices. Codes of Conducts accessed via Bank of 
America webpage.
https ://www.ml.com/
Clydesdale Bank fined 
£20.6m
(FCA 2015h)
"Clydesdale’s failings were unac-
ceptable and fell well below the 
standard the FCA expects. The 
fact that Clydesdale misled the 
Financial Ombudsman by provid-
ing false information about the 
information it held is particularly 
serious and this is reflected in the 
size of the fine.
We have been very clear about how 
firms should treat customers who 
may have been mis-sold PPI. In 
ignoring documents it held which 
were relevant to its customers’ 
complaints, Clydesdale failed to 
treat its customers fairly."
No press release to respond to the FCA press 
release.
“Compliance culture” search directs to corporate 
responsibility pages including code of conduct.
“our Enterprise Behaviours underpin the culture 
we aspire to create—with a workplace our 
employees are proud of and want to contribute 
to. How we achieve our goals is as important 
as the goal itself. This makes sure everyone is 
held accountable for demonstrating the right 
behaviours”
http://www.cybg.com/about -us/
corpo rate-respo nsibi lity/
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Firm/violation
(sourced via FCA press 
releases > 500K fine)
What the FCA said Firms compliance/culture message Website source
The Bank of New York 
Mellon London branch 
and The Bank of New 
York Mellon Interna-
tional Limited £126 m
(FCA 2015g)
“The size of the fine today reflects 
the value of safe custody assets 
held by the Firms as well as the 
seriousness of the failings and 
the fact that these failings were 
not identified by the Firms’ own 
compliance monitoring. Other 
firms with responsibility for client 
assets should take this as a further 
warning that there is no excuse for 
failing to safeguard client assets 
and to ensure their own processes 
comply with our rules.
Client assets protection continues 
to be a priority for the FCA and 
firms who hold client assets 
should review their processes in 
line with these findings to ensure 
full compliance with the Custody 
Rules.”
Press release:
"BNY Mellon has worked cooperatively with 
the FCA to address issues related to our CASS 
compliance”
"Consistent with our commitment to being a strong 
and trusted partner to our clients, BNY Mellon 
launched a broad internal review with the assis-
tance of an independent, third-party accounting 
firm and external legal advisers immediately 
upon learning of these issues. As a result, we 
have engaged in a remediation process and have 
taken clear steps to put in place a framework 
of new and improved policies and operational 
procedures as well as enhance our specialist 
resources across many functions to reinforce our 
compliance with CASS rules.”
"BNY Mellon is very mindful of the importance 
of safeguarding client assets and has been trusted 
by its clients to do so for 230 years. This trust 
could not have been earned without robust 
regulatory compliance in all of our operating 
jurisdictions, and we regret in this case that we 
did not meet our standards or those of the FCA. 
As always, regulatory compliance remains a key 
area of focus as we maintain our track record of 
safety and soundness as a financial institution."
Search on “compliance culture” and “compliance” 
indicated no matches. However statement on 
Ethics and Compliance found which linked into 
the code of conduct.
https ://www.bnyme llon.com/uk/en/
https ://www.bnyme llon.com/us/en/
who-we-are/socia l-respo nsibi lity/
ethic s-and-compl iance .jsp
Bank of Beirut fined 
£2.1m
(FCA 2015i)
“It is essential to consumer protec-
tion, market integrity and the 
prevention of financial crime that 
we can rely on firms giving us 
the right information at the right 
time. Bank of Beirut’s failings 
impeded us and left it open to 
the risk that it might be used for 
financial crime. Equally worrying 
was the fact that Wills and Allin 
provided a number of misleading 
communications to us, which is a 
serious breach of their responsi-
bilities as approved persons. We 
are reliant on compliance officers 
and internal audit to act as an 
important line of defence, to sup-
port effective regulation at firms 
and to show backbone even when 
challenged by their colleagues. 
Concerns about the culture within 
Bank of Beirut became apparent 
following supervisory visits to the 
firm in 2010 and 2011.”
No press site found on the UK site.
Dedicated page for compliance setting out major 
responsibilities:
“Bank of Beirut (UK) Ltd has an independent 
compliance function to ensure that the bank 
complies with all relevant laws, regulations, 
rules, internal policies and procedures applicable 
to its banking activities.”
http://www.banko fbeir ut.co.uk/
BOBUK /en/Compl iance 
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Firm/violation
(sourced via FCA press 
releases > 500K fine)
What the FCA said Firms compliance/culture message Website source
Aviva Investors fined 
£17.6m
(FCA 2015j)
“Ensuring that conflicts of interest 
are properly managed is central to 
the relationship of trust that must 
exist between asset managers and 
their customers. It is also a fun-
damental regulatory requirement. 
This case serves as an important 
reminder to firms of the impor-
tance of managing conflicts of 
interest effectively by implement-
ing a robust control environment 
with effective systems to manage 
the risks. Not doing so risks 
customers’ interests being over-
looked in favour of commercial or 
personal interests.
While Aviva Investors’ failings 
were serious, the FCA has recog-
nised that its actions since report-
ing its failings were exceptional. 
The level of co-operation during 
the investigation and commit-
ment to ensuring no customers 
were adversely impacted meant it 
qualified for a substantial reduc-
tion in the penalty.”
Press release:
“We fully accept the conclusions of this investiga-
tion. We have fixed the issues, improved our 
systems and controls, and ensured no customers 
have been disadvantaged. We have also made 
substantial changes to the management team 
which is leading the turnaround of Aviva Inves-
tors.
“We have a clear focus on simple and specific 
investment outcomes for clients and we are 
delivering strong levels of investment perfor-
mance within a robust control environment.”
No results found when searching under “compli-
ance culture”, or “compliance”. In addition 
it was difficult to find out any information on 
corporate governance other than the senior man-
agement structure.
https ://uk.aviva inves tors.com/conte 
nt/aviva /aviva -inves tors.html
Appendix 3 Analysis of Positive ‘Compliance Culture’ highlighted by FCA during period
FCA communication What the FCA said
“culture is not measureable but is manageable” (FCA 2016b)
https ://www.fca.org.uk/news/speec hes/cultu re-condu ct-exten ding-
accou ntabi lity-regim e
A number of levers were highlighted to manage culture including:
“communicated sense of purpose and approach […] the what and the 
how”
“tone from the top”
“formal governance processes and structures”
“people related practices, including incentives and capabilities”
“an ethical culture can be more powerful than on based solely on finan-
cial incentives”
“cultural change can take a significant period of time to achieve” (FCA 
2014d)
https ://www.fca.org.uk/news/speec hes/best-briti sh-confe rence 
The speech praises a number of initiatives within the sector promoting 
trust, fairness and integrity.
“142 year old Cooperative Bank kicked off its advertising campaign in 
the ‘fight back for trust’”
“Nationwide’s campaign uses the tagline ‘they say money goes round 
we think it’s people’”
Quoting CEO of RBS “’in banking trust is not a nice to have—it is a 
commercial essential”
Behaviours and compliance in organisations (FCA 2017)
https ://www.fca.org.uk/publi catio n/occas ional -paper s/op16-24.pdf
“regulators can also influence perceptions of the prevailing culture by 
identifying and publicising examples of good behaviour” p. 36
“the FCA publicises good behaviour when it undertakes thematic 
reviews” p. 36
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Appendix 4 Analysis of Retail Banks Who 
were not Sanctioned/or Praised During 
the Period
During the ‘Best of British’ speech by Tracey McDer-
mott (FCA 2014d), these organisations were included as 
exemplars of good ‘culture’ and ‘trust’ messages within the 
sector. Therefore, the press releases of Cooperative Bank, 
Nationwide, RBS and Virgin Money were selected as a sam-
ple. However, also to note that RBS was fined during 2014 as 
part of the wider, systemic LIBOR issues in 2014.
Organisation and website reference What they said/did
Cooperative Bank 2013 News 27/5/2013 The Co-operative Group appoints Niall Booker as Bank Chief Executive 
and Group Deputy Chief Executive Officer
Prior to this announcement there was major unrest within the Bank, with a complaint from the 
FSA about handling of PPI complaints. There were also issues with balance sheet stability 
(capital shortfall) and profit impacts. A number of new appointments were evident around 
this time in press releases.
2014 News 30/04/2014 The Co-operative Bank’s response to publication of independent 
review by Sir Christopher Kelly
“The Bank’s Board looks very different today and is now managed and governed indepen-
dently to the Group. There is an entirely new Executive team with the depth of financial 
services expertise needed to turn the Bank around and we have also been reforming and 
improving the Bank’s systems, processes and culture which Sir Christopher Kelly refers to in 
the report”
2015 News 20/01/2015 The Co-operative Bank re-launches Ethical Policy
“the re-launch of this policy is an important step in rebuilding The Co-operative Bank as we 
listen to our customers and rebuild trust”
Nationwide Website reviewed - only contained news items back to 2017 at point of research.
23/5/2017 UK’s most trusted financial brand
“The Society remains number one for customer satisfaction among its high-street peer group, 
currently leading by a margin of 5% over the next best financial provider and has been rated 
as the most trusted financial brand” (Financial Research Survey results)
RBS The RBS press release site is difficult to search effectively for historic items. One item is noted 
to span the period of the review of other banks in 2017 release.
23 October 2017 RBS welcomes the publication of the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA) 
summary report, consistent with the summary findings announced by the FCA in November 
2016
“As a result of these historical issues identified, it put in place two steps—a complaints process 
overseen by retired High Court Judge, Sir William Blackburne, and an automatic refund of 
complex fees—for SMEs in the UK and ROI that were customers in GRG during the period 
2008–2013.”
Ross McEwan, CEO of RBS said:
“I am pleased that the regulator has confirmed the findings from last November and that the 
most serious allegations made against the bank have not been upheld.
“We have acknowledged for some time that mistakes were made and have apologised that we 
did not always provide the level of service and understanding we should have done for these 
customers in the aftermath of the financial crisis.
“The culture, structure and way RBS operates today have all changed fundamentally since the 
period under review. We have made significant changes to deal with the issues of the past, so 
that the bank can better support SME customers in financial difficulty whilst also protecting 
the bank’s capital.”
Virgin money 04/11/2015 Virgin Money welcomes interim report into the credit card market from the FCA
“Virgin Money fully agrees with the conclusions of the interim report into the credit card 
market published by the FCA today [….] Virgin Money already offers simple, transparent 
credit card products. Based on the potential remedies set out in today’s report, Virgin Money 
will fully implement any changes necessary to meet the final requirements in due course and 
looks forward to supporting the FCA in their final report.”
12/01/2016 Virgin Money announces two new appointments to senior executive team
Jayne-Anne Gadhia, Chief Executive Officer said: "I am delighted to announce that Peter and 
Hugh will be joining the Virgin Money Executive Team. Their broad experience and knowl-
edge of the financial services industry, including a strong customer focus in retail banking, 
will be invaluable to us as we continue to deliver on our strategy of delivering growth, qual-
ity and returns to all of our stakeholders. I am looking forward to working with them both.”
This press release indicates a strengthening of the internal senior management, un affected by 
external forces/events to trigger change as evidenced I the use of word ‘continue’.
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Appendix 5
During our analysis, we found difficulty in identifying 
praise of specific firm’s culture/compliance by FCA. Usu-
ally we would expect to sees highlights of ‘good practice’ 
in thematic reviews. However, within the 2015/16 annual 
report it was announced that “we considered that a the-
matic review would not be the most effective and efficient 
way to continue to support and drive continued culture 
change across the sector. Instead, we decided that the most 
effective way to achieve this was to continue to engage 
individually with firms, as well as supporting other ini-
tiatives outside the FCA. We have not changed our views 
about the importance of firm culture and we will continue 
our work with individual firms” (2015/16 Annual Report). 
As an alternative method of analysis the annual reports 
were searched to review the emphasis on culture by the 
FCA year on year.
Year reviewed and weblink Number of references to 
‘culture’
Key quotations
2016/2017
https ://www.fca.org.uk/publi catio n/annua l-repor ts/annua 
l-repor t-2016-17.pdf
27 “Regulatory arbitrage, at least in the conduct arena, is a 
game no longer worth playing […] to give credit where 
it is due, much of this is the result of firms’ efforts to 
improve their business models and culture to meet our 
expectations” p.6
“Our annual review of the remuneration policies and prac-
tices of ‘Level 1 firms’ (deposit takers and investment 
firms with total balance sheets over £50bn) found they 
had undertaken significant work to embed conduct and 
culture in their remuneration policies and practices this 
year” p. 43
2015/2016
https ://www.fca.org.uk/publi catio n/corpo rate/annua 
l-repor t-2015-16.pdf
27 “Changing culture: We rolled out a supervisory approach 
in wholesale banking designed to raise the overall 
standards of conduct risk management in the industry, 
ensuring that the industry itself takes responsibility for, 
and ownership of, the management of conduct risk” P.12
“At the start of 2015/16 we identified a number of risks 
that informed our work for the year. We highlighted that 
firms’ culture, structures, processes and incentives still 
required improvements” P.30
“Firms were required to consider the culture, governance 
arrangements, policies, procedures, systems and controls 
within their UK businesses, as well as how much their 
overseas activities might impact upon their conduct in 
the UK.” P. 33
“FCA introduced new rules on whistleblowing. These 
rules aim to encourage a culture in firms where indi-
viduals feel able to raise concerns and challenge poor 
practice and behaviour.” P.34
2014/2015
https ://www.fca.org.uk/publi catio ns/corpo rate-docum 
ents/annua l-repor t-2014-15
19 “We assess firms’ business models, key personnel, control 
environment, and increasingly culture and its impact on 
conduct” P.31
“Compliance controls and culture, where we found robust 
controls and an improved cultural message being distrib-
uted across a global group” p.34
2013/2014
https ://www.fca.org.uk/publi catio n/corpo rate/annua 
l-repor t-13-14.pdf
8 The risk committee “noted the risks associated with the 
pace of change around firms’ business models and the 
culture in the financial sector; risks that the FCA sought 
to address in its 2013 Risk Outlook. It discussed these 
ongoing concerns with the FCA’s executive and has 
asked for further information on the progress made in 
implementing a programme of positive culture change 
amongst firm” P.75
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